The first half of this paper is a concise account of the skeptical argument of Kripke's Wittgenstein. What is shown to be problematic is a basic view -- or picture -- of rule-following that ALL correct applications of a rule, including those in the future, are determined by the rule, the meaning of which may be grasped once and for all in the mind of an individual, and that somehow there must be a certain 'fact' of or about the rule-follower which constitutes the rule-follower's meaning or linguistic intention. In Kripke's exposition, the skeptical paradox is due to the presumption of the presence of meaning-constituting 'fact', on which normativity is supposed to rest. Huen attempts to help illuminate why no such 'fact' can be found. It is shown to be an incoherent notion, though it has great intuitive force. The skeptical solution no longer adheres to that misconception and approaches the human rule-following phenomena in a radically different and yet, in effect, plain, view, particularly on our language-games of rule-following- or concept-attribution -- on how our "agreement of judgments": is operated in daily life. The positive approach is suggested to be called a "standpoint of FORM OF LIFE".

In the remaining part of the paper, Huen presents the main critical points of Chomsky; each of them is then followed by a reply along the line of thinking of Kripke's Wittgenstein.

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2.Chomksy v. Kripke, Round Two: Methodological Collectivisim and Explanatory Adequacy (52K) By Daniel. Barbiero

This paper examines some of the issues raised in Kenny Huen's first paper and argues that an adequate explanation of apparent rule-following (and other normatively-driven) behavior must balance reference to external factors with reference to internal factors. A model of learning based on the observation of exemplary performances and the internalization of the normative requirements they embody is offered as an example of such an explanation.

3.Clarifying the Sceptical Solution in Kripke's Wittgenstein (84K) by Kenny Huen.

This paper is a response to Daniel Barbiero's paper and a continuation of themes raised in Kenny's first paper.

4. Further Remarks in Explanatory Adequacy and the Problem of Reproduction (Parts 1 (35K) and 2(32K)) Daniel Barbiero

This paper is a reply to Kenny Huen's second paper. In Part I the author argues that Kripke's skeptical solution provides a systematic explanation -- albeit a covert one -- of rule-following and concept possession, and argues further that agreement is of the wrong order to function as an explanatory brute fact. In Part II the author elaborates on the model of learning introduced in his first paper. A postscript to the paper looks briefly at alternative solutions to the skeptical paradox.