In Chapter One of Aspects , Chomsky
compares two approaches to language acquisition: the empiricist and
the rationalist tradition. He notes that the latter is committed to
"innate ideas", whereas the former allows only "peripheral processing
mechanisms" and inductive principles. (47-48)
His particular formulation of the contrast doesn't matter for my
purposes, as much as the emphasis he puts on the nature of the
mind at birth. It is here, I gather, that rationalists and
empiricists traditionally differ. To use a metaphor: while
empiricists say the belief box is empty at birth (i.e. there aren't
any innate ideas), the rationalists disagree.
Put in these mentalistic terms, the disagreement comes out clearly.
But: what becomes of the distinction when, with Chomsky, we eventually
replace talk of the mind in favour of talk about the brain? After
all, Locke and Descartes (for example) didn't really disagree about
the nature of the brain -- so far as I know.
It seems to me, then, that the debate about the innateness hypothesis
(to use terms that Chomsky hates) must be reframed. How ought we
reframe it? (A precondition on a satisfactory restatement of the
debate is that neither side should come out obviously right.
And something should hang on it. Otherwise, the debate will appear
boring and easily settled. And it's neither boring nor easy.)
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