|
Rational Choice |
Historical |
Sociological |
Scholars |
William Riker, Oliver Williamson, Kenneth Shepsle, Terry Moe |
Peter Hall, Theda Skocpol, Sven Steimo, Kathleen Thelen, Margaret Weir |
Walter Powell, John Meyer, Brian Rowan, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman, Niel Fligstein |
What are institutions? |
Formal structures and procedures |
Formal and informal structures |
Symbolic Systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates |
What do institutions do? |
Solve collective action problems. Structure strategic individuals’ preferences. |
Distribute power and resources; lead to unintended consequences; help to shape and influence preferences. |
Give meaning to individuals and organizations |
Where do institutions come from? |
Peoples’ desire to solve certain problems; i.e., uncertainty for interest groups or for firms and suppliers |
Historical choices. Some type of upheaval or dramatic change leading to disequalibrium and opportunities for change, i.e., OPEC |
Previous institutions. Search for social legitimacy. |
Why do institutions persist? |
They suit the interests of participants, i.e., they solve the collective action problems. |
Historical inertia. Power asymmetries make change difficult. |
They become taken for granted. |
How do they help us understand public policy? |
Institutions channel interests. |
Provide an historical context. Cross-national in scope. |
Provides a way of thinking about the origins of values, interests, and preferences. |