

## Back to the Agency Problem



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- How do you motivate the CEO to work hard?
  - Board of directors
  - Profit Sharing
  - Auditors

## Board of Directors

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- Make boards external.
- And how do you motivate persons to go on a board?
  - Time and effort
  - Risk

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- Two issues
  - If you don't pay him, he will cheat you with inattention.
  - If you do pay him, he may still cheat you with phony books.

## The Basic Idea

- The Accountants were supposed to prevent fraud, like the bank supervising your Saturday employee from conspiring with the bank teller.
- Things did not work as planned.

## So What Else is New

- "Behind every accounting standard there lies a fraud"
- The McKesson Robins fraud of the 1940's

## The Accountants

- Some cases
  - Enron
  - Global Crossing
  - World Com
  - Tycho
  - Xerox
  - Health South

## Enron

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    - But Enron had contracts with other companies to cover this risk. Someone else was “naked”. No disclosure.
- There were secret deals where Enron was responsible for the risk.

## Taking in each others wash

- Global Crossing signed a contract to purchase \$100 of services from another company.
- The other company signed a contract to purchase \$100 of services from Global Crossing.

## Taking in each others wash

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  - Thus net profits of \$95 this year.
  - So did the other company.
- This seems curious.

## Taking in each others wash

- Global crossing counted the \$X of sales as revenue over \$5 billion (20 years)
- So did the other company.

The two companies were audited by different accounting companies.

## World Com

- Took \$4 billion of expenses and treated them as capital expenses.
- That is

\$4,000,000,000

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- Took \$4 billion of expenses and treated them as capital expenses.
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\$4,0

No one caught it.

Arthur Andersen

Securities Analysts

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End

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