

Motivating Takeover Bids



A Problem

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 - Shares are selling at \$40
- New Management can increase profits to π' and shares to \$80

The Opportunity

- Offer to pay existing shareholders \$60
 - Existing shareholders make money.
 - You make money.

The Fly in the Ointment

		Tender Offer	
		Successful	Not Successful
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	Don't Tender	\$80	\$40

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Dominant Strategy

Some Suggestions

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Not legal under US
Securities Law

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 - Secretly buy the first 5% at \$40 and then make intentions public

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- This is the edge in American Law
- The effect is to reduce the incentives for takeovers.

End

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