


The Cournot Model




Assumptions

- Two firms A, and B produce widgets


Assumptions

- Two firms A, and B produce widgets
- The industry demand function is D




Assumptions

- Two firms A, and B produce widgets
- The industry demand function is D
- Firm A produces q_A ; firm B produces q_B




Assumptions




- Two firms A, and B produce widgets
- The industry demand function is D
- Firm A produces q_A ; firm B produces q_B
- Firm A takes its demand function as $D - q_B$



Assumptions

- Two firms A, and B produce widgets
- The industry demand function is D
- Firm A produces q_A ; firm B produces q_B
- **Firm A takes its demand function as $D - q_B$**





Symmetry

- Just as Firm A is choosing q_A to maximize profits, so too is Firm B choosing q_B to maximize profits.

The Kent State University logo and the text "The Cournot Model" are at the bottom.

Symmetry

- Just as Firm A is choosing q_A to maximize profits, so too is Firm B choosing q_B to maximize profits.
- If B changes its output, A will react by changing its output.

The Kent State University logo and the text "The Cournot Model" are at the bottom.

A Reaction Function

- We do the mathematical approach first and then the graphical approach.

The Kent State University logo and the text "The Cournot Model" are at the bottom.

A Reaction Function

- The industry demand function

$$Q = 100 - 2p.$$

A Reaction Function

- The industry demand function
- The inverse demand function is

$$P = 50 - (1/2)Q$$

A Reaction Function

- The industry demand function
- The inverse demand function is
- A's demand function is then

$$Q = 100 - 2p.$$

$$P = 50 - (1/2)Q$$

$$P = 50 - (1/2)(q_A + q_B)$$

A Reaction Function

A's demand function is then

$$P = 50 - (1/2)(q_A + q_B)$$

- The firm's profits are

$$\pi = Pq_A - 5q_A$$

A Reaction Function

A's demand function is then

$$P = 50 - (1/2)(q_A + q_B)$$

- The firm's profits are

$$\pi = [50 - (1/2)(q_A + q_B)]q_A - 5q_A$$

A Reaction Function

$$\pi = [50 - (1/2)(q_A + q_B)]q_A - 5q_A$$

A Reaction Function

$$\pi = [50 - (1/2)(q_A + q_B)]q_A - 5q_A$$

$$\pi = 50q_A - (1/2)q_A^2 - (1/2)q_Bq_A - 5q_A$$

A Reaction Function

$$\pi = [50 - (1/2)(q_A + q_B)]q_A - 5q_A$$

$$\pi = 50q_A - (1/2)q_A^2 - (1/2)q_Bq_A - 5q_A$$

$$\pi = 45q_A - (1/2)q_A^2 - (1/2)q_Bq_A$$

A Reaction Function

$$\pi = 45q_a - \frac{1}{2}q_a^2 - \frac{1}{2}q_aq_b$$

A Reaction Function

$$\pi = 45q_a - \frac{1}{2}q_a^2 - \frac{1}{2}q_aq_b$$

$$\frac{d\pi}{dq_a} = 45 - q_a - \frac{1}{2}q_b$$

A Reaction Function

$$\frac{d\pi}{dq_a} = 45 - q_a - \frac{1}{2}q_b = 0$$

$$q_a = 45 - \frac{1}{2}q_b$$

Symmetry

$$q_A = 45 - (1/2)q_B$$

- There is a similar reaction function for B

$$q_B = 45 - (1/2)q_A$$

Solving for A's Output

$$q_A = 45 - (1/2)q_B$$



$$q_B = 45 - (1/2)q_A$$

$$q_A = 45 - (1/2)[45 - (1/2)q_A]$$

Solving for A's Output

$$q_A = 45 - (1/2)[45 - (1/2)q_A]$$

$$q_A = 22.5 + (1/4)q_A$$

Solving for A's Output

$$q_A = 45 - (1/2)[45 - (1/2)q_A]$$

$$q_A = 22.5 + (1/4)q_A$$

$$(3/4)q_A = 22.5$$

Solving for A's Output

$$q_A = 45 - (1/2)[45 - (1/2)q_A]$$

$$q_A = 22.5 + (1/4)q_A$$

$$(3/4)q_A = 22.5$$

$$q_A = (4/3)22.5$$

Solving for A's Output

$$q_A = 45 - (1/2)[45 - (1/2)q_A]$$

$$q_A = 22.5 + (1/4)q_A$$

$$(3/4)q_A = 22.5$$

$$q_A = (4/3)22.5$$

$$q_A = 30$$

$$q_B = 30$$

A Graphical Approach

$$q_A = 45 - (1/2)q_B$$

- We want to use the reaction function to come to a graphical solution,

A Graphical Approach

$$q_A = 45 - (1/2)q_B$$

- When B produces nothing A should react by producing the monopoly output (45).

A Graphical Approach

$$q_A = 45 - (1/2)q_B$$

- When B produces nothing A should react by producing the monopoly output (45).
- When B produces the output of the competitive industry (90), A should react by producing nothing.

A Graphical Approach

$$q_A = 45 - (1/2)q_B$$

- When B produces nothing A should react by producing the monopoly output (45).
- When B produces the output of the competitive industry (90), A should react by producing nothing.
- Similar rules apply for B's reactions.

Graphing the Reaction Function

A's Output

B's Output

Graphing the Reaction Function

A's Output

90

45

0

If B produces nothing, A acts like a monopoly

If B produces the competitive output, A produces nothing.

B's Output

90

Graphing the Reaction Function







A's Output

45


A's Reaction Function

B's Output

90



Equilibrium



The Basic Steps

- Plot the reaction functions
 - If B produces nothing, A behaves like a monopoly
 - If B produces competitive output, A produces nothing
- Solve for their intersection

End

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